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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN JANE WALTERS, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
vs . : 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, : Case No. 890671 CA 
Category 15 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this 
domestic relations matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2) 
(h) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Did the trial court err by establishing a marital 
relationship between the parties beginning on or about January 1, 
1980/ when the parties did not solemnize their marriage until 
October of 1984? 
Though the trial court treated the characterization of 
the marital relationship as a finding of factf this particular 
issue regards a conclusion of law underlying the judgment. The 
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appellate court is not bound by the trial court's characterization 
of its determination as a finding of fact or conclusion of law. 
50 West Broadway Assocs. v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake, 124 
Utah Adv.Rep. 6 (1989). To establish the marital relationship in 
question, the court had to interpret a statute which presents a 
question of law. State ex rel. Division of Consumer Protection v. 
Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 127 Utah Adv.Rep. 4 (1990); Henretty v. Manti 
City Corporation, 127 Utah Adv.Rep. 8 (1990). In reviewing 
Conclusions of Law, the appellate court accords Conclusions of Law 
with no particular deference but reviews them for correctness. 
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P2d 1068,1070 (Utah 1985). 
II. Did the trial court err in dividing the property 
including real property acquired by the Defendant prior to the 
marriage being solemnized, and Defendant's retirement benefits on 
the basis of a one hundred nine (109) month relationship when 
indeed the parties were married for only fifty-two (52) months? 
This issue challenges the trial court's Findings of Fact 
which is to be set aside on appeal if clearly erroneous. Utah R. 
of Civ. P. 52(a) (as amended, effective January 1, 1987). The 
trial court used equitable principles in dividing the real property 
and retirement benefits in question. The "clearly erroneous" 
standard applies regardless whether action is in equity or at law. 
Bountiful v. Riley, 124 Utah Adv.Rep. 15 (1989). The appellate 
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court may regard a Finding as clearly erroneous if it is induced 
by an erroneous view of the law. State v. Walker, 743 P2d 191,193 
(Utah 1987). 
III. Did the trial court err in awarding the Plaintiff 
ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($1,000.00) attorney's fees though the parties 
stipulated that neither party was presently in need of or entitled 
to the continuing financial support of the other, including 
alimony? 
The proper standard of review is "clearly erroneous" as 
this is a challenge of the trial court's Findings of Fact. Utah 
R. of Civ. P. 52(a). The Finding is clearly erroneous if the 
appellate court is convinced that a mistake has been made. 
Bountiful v. Riley, 124 Utah Adv.Rep. 15 (1989). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated, §30-1-4.5, §30-1-2 (as amended 
1984), and §30-1-17.2 (1971) are the applicable statutes in this 
matter, copies of which are included in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE AND DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT. 
This is an appeal from a Decree of Divorce and the 
Amended Decree of Divorce of the Fourth Judicial District Court, 
in which the Honorable Ray M. Harding, having issued a Memorandum 
Decision, ordered that the Plaintiff/Respondent (Helen Jane 
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Walters) was to be awarded for her equitable share of the parties 
equity in realty acquired by their joint efforts during their 
"marriage like relationship". The Decree also awarded the 
Plaintiff a proportionate share of the Defendant's 
(Defendant/Appellant Lewis Mark Walters) retirement benefits earned 
through his employment during the "marriage like relationship". 
After a trial on the merits, the Court entered a 
Memorandum Decision finding that a "marriage like relationship" 
between the parties began on or about January 1, 1980 though the 
marriage was not solemnized until October 5, 1984. During the 
period between January 1, 1980 and October 5, 1984, the Defendant 
acquired the real property of which was awarded to the Plaintiff. 
The Plaintiff was also awarded a proportionate share of the 
retirement benefits earned by the Defendant during that period of 
time. 
The trial court entered a subsequent Memorandum Decision 
of which the Plaintiff was awarded attorney fees. This ruling was 
incorporated into the Decree of Divorce and the Amended Decree of 
Divorce. 
The Defendant appeals from the Decree of Divorce and the 
Amended Decree of Divorce stating that the Plaintiff is not 
entitled to the real property awarded to her because it was 
acquired by the Defendant during the period between January 1, 1980 
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and October 5, 1984 which was before the solemnization of the 
marriage. Likewise, the Plaintiff is not entitled to a 
proportionate share of the Defendant's retirement benefits earned 
by the Defendant during the period between January 1, 1980 and 
October 5, 1984. The Defendant also appeals from the Order 
awarding the Plaintiff attorney fees. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND RELEVANT FACTS. 
In December of 1978, the Plaintiff and Defendant met. 
(Tr.15). At that time, the Plaintiff, and her two year old 
daughter from a previous marriage, resided in her trailer which was 
located in Orem, Utah. (Tr.30-31). The Defendant, working for the 
United States Air Force, was frequently called to work on temporary 
duty (TDY) assignments out of state at guided missile sights. 
(Tr.92). The Defendant resided in several States from 1978 through 
1984 because of these TDY assignments. During this period, he 
resided in Montana, Missouri, South Dakota, Wyoming, and North 
Dakota. (Ex.10) (Tr.72-74,92). While the Defendant resided ir 
these several States from 1978 through 1984, he made infrequent 
returns to Utah. (Tr.53). During this period, the Defendant 
maintained a habitable trailer in Highland, Utah, of which the 
water, gas, and utilities were always hooked up. (Tr.53-54). 
However, when the Defendant would return to Utah, he lived with the 
Plaintiff in her trailer. (Tr.54). 
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In July of 1977, the Defendant acquired real property in 
Highland, Utah. (Tr.94) (Ex.11). Said final payment for this 
property was made by the Defendant on May 23, 1981. (Tr.94) 
(Ex.14). 
When the parties first met, the Plaintiff resided in her 
trailer in Orem, Utah. In May of 1980, Defendant purchased, in 
his own name, a trailer pad at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, 
Utah. (Tr.96) (Ex.15). At that time, the parties moved 
Plaintiff's mobile trailer onto that property. The Defendant paid 
for the costs of moving the trailer to the Pleasant Grove location 
as well as the costs incurred for culinary water and sewer 
connections. (Tr.96) From that time forward, the Plaintiff has 
resided in her trailer at that location. The Defendant paid for 
substantial improvements at this sight. (Tr.37,96). The Defendant 
did not charge Plaintiff rent for the placement of her trailer on 
the pad or for her use of the realty as her residence. (Tr.39). 
The Plaintiff's resources were used for the everyday necessities 
for herself and her daughter such as groceries, utilities, and 
trailer payments. (Tr.39). 
Prior to and after the Plaintiff moved her trailer onto 
Defendant's lot, the Defendant assisted the Plaintiff by paying a 
number of debts and obligations of the Plaintiff's which included 
IRS - $4,000.00, State Tax Commission - $2,700.00, payment on 
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trailer - $3#000.00, payment on car loan - $400.00, payment on 
television loan - $150.00, bills from a Wyoming accident -
$1,000.00, and the costs of moving her trailer from Orem to 
Pleasant Grove - $521.00. (Tr.86-88,105-106) (Ex.13). These 
expenses totalling TEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY-ONE DOLLARS 
($10,371.00) were all paid by the Defendant for the Plaintiff's 
behalf of which the Defendant makes no claims for, (Tr.105), and 
of which he expected nothing in return. (Tr.88). At the time the 
Defendant paid these expenses, there was not an arrangement with 
regard to a marital relationship. 
In the Fall of 1981, with the Defendant's knowledge, the 
Plaintiff enrolled her daughter in school under the last name of 
Walters. (Tr.42-43,107). 
From 1978 through 1983, the Plaintiff filed her tax 
returns under the name of Hunter, the name from her previous 
marriage. (Tr.49-52) (Ex.3). Not until 1984, the year the parties 
were married, did the parties file a joint tax return. (Tr.52). 
Prior to their marriage in 1984, the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant kept separate checking accounts of which the Defendant 
never intermingled his money with the Plaintiff's. (Tr.58). 
Nevertheless, the Defendant would periodically help the Plaintiff 
by paying her debts and obligations. (Tr.58-59) (Ex.13). 
In July of 1984, the Plaintiff joined the Defendant in 
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North Dakota where the parties resided together. (Tr.44,72). On 
October 5, 1984, the parties were married in Manitoba, Canada. 
(Tr.ll). 
On July 19, 1985, the Defendant, with his own funds, 
acquired in his name a parcel of property located at 640 South 50 
West in Pleasant Grove, Utah. (Tr.99) (Ex.11,16). This property 
was in the same trailer park facility as the 625 South 50 West 
property of which the parties lived. In October 1985, Defendant 
placed his trailer on that property. (Tr.100). Defendant had 
purchased such trailer in 1977 which he had kept in Highland, Utah. 
(Tr.101). At the time of trial (February 1989) the 640 South 50 
West property had an encumbrance of $5,000.00. (Tr.81) (Ex.11). 
During the marriage differences between the parties 
developed resulting in their separation on or about November 10, 
1987. (R.149) 
At the time the parties met, the Plaintiff was employed 
by Geneva Steel. This employment continued except for a period 
when Geneva Steel ceased operations. At the time of trial, 
Plaintiff had been reemployed by Geneva Steel for approximately 
one (1) year. (Tr.36-37). While living at 625 South 50 West, 
Pleasant Grove, Utah, the Plaintiff contributed her earnings 
towards the purchase of food, utilities, and other regular living 
expenses. (R.151). 
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On October 26, 1987, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint for 
divorce. (R.l). On February 7, 1989, the parties appeared before 
the Honorable Ray M. Harding for purposes of terminating the 
marriage and dividing real and personal property. (R.3-4). 
Following the trial, Judge Harding entered a Memorandum 
Decision finding "that the parties began to carry on a marriage 
like relationship on or about January 1, 1980, which was several 
years before the marriage was actually solemnized." (R.99). 
From the established date of January 1, 1980, Judge 
Harding found that the Plaintiff was entitled to a share of 
Defendant's retirement benefits accrued during the existence of 
the marriage. The formula used to apportion the Plaintiff's share 
of the retirement benefits was derived from Marchant v. Marchant, 
743 P2d 199, (Utah App. 1987), which awards one-half of the "total 
monthly payment times the fraction in which the numerator consists 
of the number of years or months they were married during which 
the Defendant was employed by the federal government and the 
denominator is the total number of years or months Defendant was 
in such employment." (R.100). 
In regards to the distribution of real property, the 
trial court found that the property at issue was partially acquired 
before the marriage, and partially after. Considering when the 
properties were obtained, and how they were paid for, the court 
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found the following to be an equitable division of the real 
property: 
The Plaintiff is to receive the property in 
Pleasant Grove where her mobile home is 
located free and clear. The Defendant may 
keep the Highland property which he acquired 
before the marriage, and the other Pleasant 
Grove property subject to the $5,000.00 
encumbrance which is still owing on that 
property. (R.101). 
On July 31, 1989, the trial court, in a second Memorandum 
Decision, awarded the Plaintiff ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($1,000.00) 
for attorney fees "based on need and the relative ability of the 
parties to pay." (R.115). Prior to this decision, it was 
represented to the Court that the Plaintiff was totally self 
supported from income earned from her employment at Geneva Steel, 
(R.lll), and as incorporated in the Findings of Fact, it was found 
that neither party appeared to be in present need of or entitled 
to the continuing financial support of the other, either in the 
form of alimony or child support. (R.149). 
The foregoing Memorandums were incorporated in the 
Amended Decree of Divorce. (R.168). 
On November 9, 1989, the Defendant filed his Notice of 
Appeal from the Decision rendered by Judge Harding. (R.172). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State of Utah did not recognize an unsolemnized 
relationship as a marriage prior to 1987. The District Court 
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established a marital relationship between the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant beginning on or about January 1, 1980f though the parties 
did not solemnize the marriage until October 5, 1984. The District 
Court erred by applying equitable principals to the marriage like 
relationship by awarding Plaintiff a parcel of real estate 
purchased by the Defendant on May 27, 1980. The District Court 
also erred by awarding Plaintiff a portion of Defendant's 
retirement benefits on the basis of an one hundred nine (109) month 
relationship though the parties were married legally for only some 
fifty-two (52) months. 
Before Utah adopted §30-1-4.5 in 1987, it did not 
recognize an unsolemnized relationship as a marriage, even though 
the parties to the relationship may have acted in other respects 
as spouses. §30-1-4.5 is to be applied prospectively and not 
retroactively. Therefore, the District Court mischaracterized the 
Plaintiff's and the Defendant's relationship as a marriage from 
January 1, 1980 until October 5, 1984. 
In the alternative, the Defendant claims that there was 
not a marriage like relationship prior to the solemnization on 
October 5, 1984. The District Court misconstrued Utah Code Ann. 
§30-1-4.5, by determining a marriage under that section more than 
one year after the duration of the relationship in question. 
Though the decision to award attorney's fees in divorce 
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proceedings rests primarily in the sound discretion of the trial 
court, the award must be based on evidence of both financial need 
and reasonableness. Such evidence was not produced before the 
trial court. The court relied on the Plaintiff's attorney's 
Affidavit in Support of Attorney's Fees which acknowledged that the 
Plaintiff was totally self supported from an income earned from her 
present employment. Thus, there was no financial need for attorney 
fees to be awarded. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UNSOLEMNIZED RELATIONSHIP FROM JANUARY 1, 1980, UNTIL 
OCTOBER 5, 1984, SHOULD NOT BE RECOGNIZED 
AS A VALID MARRIAGE RELATIONSHIP 
A. Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5 enacted in 1987 is to be 
applied prospectively and not retroactively. 
Though the trial court did not refer directly to Utah 
Code Ann. §30-1-4.5, the Court established that the Plaintiff and 
the Defendant "began to carry on a marriage like relationship on 
or about January 1, 1980f which was several months before the 
marriage was actually solemnized." The parties eventually did 
solemnize their marriage on October 5, 1984. Because the Court 
considered the parties to have begun their marital relationship on 
Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5 is entitled validity of marriage 
not solemnized. A copy of which is attached in the Addendum. 
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January 1, 1980, it was determined that the parties were married 
for one hundred nine (109)-months. The Defendant argues that the 
length of the marriage was in fact fifty two (52) months, measured 
from the time the marriage was solemnized. (Tr.5). 
The Utah Court of Appeals recently addressed Utah Code 
Ann. §30-1-4.5 in Layton v. Layton, 777 P2d 504 (Utah App. 1989). 
In Layton, the Court found that before the adoption of §30-1-4.5 
in 1987, "Utah did not recognize an unsolemnized relationship as 
a marriage, even though the parties to the relationship may have 
acted in other respects as spouses." Id. at 505. Also, the Court 
determined that §30-1-4.5 has only prospective, and not 
retroactive, effect. Id. 
In reviewing the property division, the trial court 
decided that the property was to be divided according to the 
equitable principals governing divorce actions. Determining that 
the marital relationship began in 1980, the Plaintiff was awarded 
the real property located at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, 
Utah, free and clear. (R.101). This property was purchased by the 
Defendant in his own name in May of 1980. (Tr.96). The Defendant 
paid for the costs of moving the Plaintiff's trailer to this 
location, (Tr.96), and allowed the Plaintiff to reside there rent 
free. (Tr.39). The Defendant also paid for substantial 
improvements at this sight. All this was done prior to the parties 
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solemnizing their marriage. The Plaintiff was also awarded a share 
of Defendant's retirement benefits accrued during the existence of 
the marriage beginning on January 1, 1980. (R.100). The formula 
used to apportion the Plaintiff's share of this retirement benefit 
comes from Marchant v. Mar chant, 743 P2d 199 (Utah App. 1987). 
Such formula calls for one-half (50%) of the total amount of all 
the Defendant's monthly benefit payments be multiplied by the 
fraction in which the numerator is 109 and the denominator is the 
total number of months the Defendant is employed by the federal 
government. (R.166). The numerator of 109 is derived from the 
trial court's establishment of a marital relationship beginning on 
January lf 1980. 
It is apparent that the trial court erred by applying 
§30-1-4.5 retroactively. This resulted in the trial court 
mischaracterizing the relationship between the parties as a 
marriage from January 1, 1980 until October 5, 1984. Thus, the 
Plaintiff was wrongfully awarded the real property at 625 South 50 
West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. Also, the numerator used in the 
Marchant formula used to award a proportionate share of the 
Defendant's retirement benefit should be eliminated or refigured 
14 
from the date of the solemnization of the marriage. 
B. The Trial Court Erred By Establishing A Marriage Like 
Relationship From January 1, 1980 Until October 5, 1984, 
Prior to 1987, marriages not solemnized by an authorized 
person were prohibited and declared void. Utah Code Ann. §30-1-2 
(3) (1984); In re Vetas' Estate, 110 Utah 187, 170 P2d 183 (1946). 
See Mattes v. Olearain, 759 P2d 1177 (Utah App. 1988). 
In the event it is permissible to recognize a marriage 
like relationship between the parties from January 1# 1980 until 
October 5, 1984, it is evident that the trial court erred by 
establishing a marriage like relationship. The Court was not at 
privy to determine or establish that such a relationship existed. 
According to §30-1-4.5, 
"(1) A marriage which is not solemnized. . . 
shall be legal and valid if a court. . . 
establishes that it arises out of a contract 
between two consenting parties who: 
(a) are capable of giving consent; 
(b) are legally capable of entering a 
solemnized marriage under the provisions of 
this chapter; 
(c) have cohabited; 
(d) mutually assume marital rights, 
duties, and obligations; 
(e) who hold themselves out as and have 
acquired a uniform and general reputation as 
husband and wife. 
The numerator of 109 is the number of months the parties 
were married from January 1, 1980. The appropriate numerator 
should be 52, the number of months the parties were married after 
the solemnization of the marriage if Plaintiff should share at all. 
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(2) The determination for establishment of a 
marriage under this section must occur during 
the relationship described in subsection (1), 
or within one year following the termination 
of that relationship.fl Id. (emphasis added). 
As subsection (2) points out, the determination for the 
establishment of a common law marriage must occur during such 
relationship/ or within one year following the termination of that 
relationship. The relationship in question from January 1, 1980 
up until October 5, 1984 was not determined or established to be 
a common law marriage until February 15, 1989. (R.99). This 
determination was more than four (4) years after the solemnization 
of the marriage. 
It is also evident that the parties themselves did not 
recognize that a binding marriage like relationship existed prior 
to October 5, 1984. Prior to the marriage, the Defendant resided 
in several States making infrequent returns to Utah. (Tr.53,72-
74,92). From 1978 through 1983, the Plaintiff filed her tax 
returns under the name of Hunter, the name from her previous 
marriage. (Tr.49-52). It was not until 1984, the year that the 
parties were married, that the parties filed a joint tax return. 
(Tr.52). The record shows no evidence that the parties held 
themselves out as husband and wife nor required a uniform and 
general reputation as being husband and wife. The parties knew 
that they did not have a marriage like relationship evidenced by 
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the fact that they decided to have a solemnized marriage on October 
5, 1984. (Tr.5) 
Regarding the property acquired and the retirement 
benefit's earned prior to the solemnization of the marriage, the 
equitable provisions of §30-1-17.2 would also be inappropriate to 
apply in the instant case. "To hold otherwise would legitimate 
a knowing common law relationship the legislature had expressly 
declared invalid." Mattes v. Olearain, 759 P2d at 1181. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES WHERE THERE 
WAS NO EVIDENCE OF FINANCIAL NEED 
Attorney's fees in divorce actions may be ordered under 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3 (1989). There are two requirements which 
must be met before a court can award attorney's fees. "The trial 
court must find the requesting party is in need of financial 
assistance that the fees requested are reasonable." Bagshaw v. 
Bagshaw, 192 Utah Adv.Rep. 53, 55 (Ct.App. 1990); Riche v. Riche, 
123 Utah Adv.Rep. 31, 34 (Ct.App. 1989); see generally Newmeyer v. 
Newmeyer, 745 P2d 1276, 1279-80 (Utah 1987); Beals v. Beals, 682 
P2d 862,864 (Utah 1984); Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P2d 476,480 
(Utah Ct.App. 1988). 
^ §30-1-17.2 pertains to property accumulated subsequent to 
a marriage. A copy is attached in the Addendum. 
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The trial court heard no evidence regarding the 
Plaintiff's need for financial assistance. It relied on the 
Plaintiff's attorney's Affidavit In Support of Attorney's Fees in 
awarding the Plaintiff ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($1,000.00) "based on 
need and the relative ability of the parties to pay." (R.115). 
In the Affidavit of Support of Attorney's Fees, the 
Plaintiff's attorney proffered that the Plaintiff was totally self 
supportive from income earned from her present employment at Geneva 
Steel. (R.lll). Also, in the adopted Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law it was found that neither party appeared "to be 
presently in need of or entitled to the continuing financial 
support of the other, either in the form of alimony or child 
support." (R.149). At the time of trial, Plaintiff had been 
reemployed by Geneva Steel for approximately one (1) year. (Tr.36-
37). Her total gross income for 1988 was TWENTY SIX THOUSAND ONE 
HUNDRED EIGHTY-TWO and 40/100 DOLLARS ($26,182.40). (R.lll). 
Prior to the solemnization of the marriage, the Plaintiff 
received great assistance from the Defendant who paid for a number 
of debts and obligations of the Plaintiff's. The expenses paid 
by the Defendant enabled the Plaintiff to preserve her assets. 
These expenses totalled TEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY-ONE 
DOLLARS ($10,371.00). (Ex.13). The Plaintiff is free from these 
Supra page 7 of Brief. 
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debts and obligations and little if any payments are still due on 
the trailer in which she resides. The Defendant has assisted the 
Plaintiff with trailer payments totalling at least THREE THOUSAND 
DOLLARS ($3f000. 00). (Ex.13). 
It was improper for the trial court to award the 
Plaintiff attorney's fees without determining that the Plaintiff 
was in financial need. 
CONCLUSION 
The Fourth Judicial District Court erred by establishing 
a marital relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant 
beginning on or about January 1, 1980, though the parties did not 
solemnize their marriage until October of 1984. Utah Code Ann. 
§30-1-4.5, which recognizes properly formed common law marriagesf 
was not enacted until 1987. Such statute has only prospective, and 
not retroactive/ effect. Alsof the common law marriage 
relationship must be established during or within one year 
following the purported marriage like relationship. Thus, the 
trial court mischaracterized the parties relationship as a 
marriage. Awarding the Plaintiff property and retirement benefits 
acquired prior to the solemnization of the marriage would 
legitimate a knowing common law relationship of which the 
legislature has expressly declared invalid. 
The trial court also erred by awarding the Plaintiff 
19 
attorney fees without establishing that the Plaintiff was in 
financial need. 
The Defendant asks that the Court remand this case to 
the Fourth Judicial District Court to enable it to redistribute the 
real property and retirement benefits acquired by the Defendant 
prior to the solemnization of the marriage. The recognized date 
of marriage should be that of October 5, 1984 the date in which 
the parties had a solemnized marriage. Also, it is inappropriate 
for the Plaintiff to be awarded attorney fees as there is no 
evidence that she is in financial need. 
DATED this 7^ day of May, 1990. 
AwK' 
ROBERT L. MOODY 
TAYLOR, MOODY & THOlME 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OP MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the T^ day of May, 1990, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to Thomas H. Means, 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent, 363 North University Ave., Suite 
103, Provo, Utah 84604; postage prepaid. 
•hjUri H 
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ADDENDUM 
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IN THE' FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
* • * * * • * • * * • * * • * • * • * * * 
HELLEN JAYNE WALTERS, 
Plaintiff, CASE NUMBER CV 87 2408 
-vs- RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, 
Defendant. MEMORANDUM DECISION 
* * * * • • * * • * • * * • • * * * * * * 
The Court, having conducted the trial of this matter on 
February 7th, 1989 and having taken all issues under advisement, 
will rule at this time. 
The Court finds that the parties in this action are 
residents of Utah County, and the Court has jurisdiction. Each 
of the parties is granted a divorce against the other on grounds 
of irreconcilable differences. The Court finds that such grounds 
exist. The Court will not award alimony to either party. 
There was an issue raised at trial as to exactly when 
the marital relationship between the parties began. The Court 
finds, based on the evidence presented at trial, that the parties 
began to carry on a marriage like relationship on or about 
January 1, 1980, which was several years before the marriage was 
actually solemnized. 
The Court considered a number of factors in determining 
that the marital relationship began in 1980. Among" these is the 
fact that the defendant stayed in the plaintiff's 'trailer with 
her when he was not working out of state. The defendant had the 
plaintiff's trailer moved onto a lot which he was paying for, and 
did not charge rent. The plaintiff made improvements on the 
1939 Fn 
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property such as would be expected of a married couple* The 
defendant paid debts and obligations for the plaintiff including 
substantial debts to the I.R.S. and the State Tax Commission. 
The plaintiff's child with the defendant's consent was enrolled 
in school under the name Walters. While working out of state, 
the defendant sent the plaintiff money to live on. Based on the 
foregoing circumstances, the Court finds that the parties 
established a marital relationship beginning on or about January 
1st, 1980. This is an approximate date because the Court does 
not have sufficient evidence to fix an exact date. 
Because the Court considers the parties to have begun 
their marital relationship on January 1, 1980, plaintiff is 
entitled to a share of defendant's retirement benefits accrued 
during the existence of the marriage. The formula which is to be 
used to apportion the plaintiff's share of the retirement benefit 
is found in Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1987). 
The plaintiff will not receive any retirement benefits until the 
defendant retires. If for any reason the defendant does not 
qualify for the benefit, neither will the plaintiff. In order to 
become eligible to receive retirement benefits when they become 
available, plaintiff's counsel must prepare an order which is to 
be filed with the defendant's employer which will give the 
instructions for payment of retirement benefits to the plaintiff. 
The formula which should be used in the order is "one half of his 
total monthly payment times the fraction in which the numerator 
consists of the number of years or months they were married 
during which the defendant was employed by the federal government 
and the denominator is the total number of years or months 
defendant was in such employment." Marchant, at 206. The 
fraction cannot be determined until the defendant retires. If 
the parties wish to avoid the need to enter such an order, they 
may wish -to consider a cash settlement of the retirement 
benefi ts. 
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The real property which is at issue was partially 
acquired before the marriage, and partially after. Considering 
when the properties were obtained, and how they were paid for, 
the Court finds the following to be an equitable division of the 
real property. The plaintiff is to receive the property in 
Pleasant Grove where her mobile home is located free and clear, 
The defendant may keep the Highland property which he acquired 
before the marriage, and the other Pleasant Grove- property 
subject to the $5,000.00 encumbrance which is still owing on that 
property. The Court finds that this is a fair division of the 
property which was either acquired or paid for during the 
marriage. 
The Court, having no evidence as to the amount of money 
in the Deseret Bank, or the America First accounts during or 
before the marriage, will award plaintiff half of each of those. 
Plaintiff is to receive $400.00 from the Deseret Bank Account, 
and $2750.00 of the America First account. 
The Court has no evidence of values with which to 
divide the disputed personal property of the parties. The 
parties are therefore given the option of either agreeing on a 
division of property between themselves, or having one party 
prepare two lists of property and the other selecting a list. If 
the parties have not used one of these methods to divide the 
property within 10 days, the Court orders the property sold and 
the proceeds divided. 
The Court will consider the issue of attorney's fees 
upon submission of affidavits by counsel. 
Counsel for plaintiff to prepare findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and a decree of divorce, and an order 
regarding retirement benefits, if necessary, and submit them to 
opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to filing with the 
Court for signature. 
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Dated this 15th day of February, 1989 
BY 
cc: Robert L. Moody, Esq. 
Thomas H. Means, Esq. 
RAYXM. HARDING, JUDG 
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THOMAS H. MEANS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
81 East Center 
P.O. Box 2283 
Provo, Utah, 84603 
[801] 377-7980 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
V ] 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, ] 
Defendant. ' 
| AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
| No. CV 87 2408 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
County of Utah ) 
Your affiant, upon his oath, swears and deposes as follows: 
1. My name is Thomas H. Means; I am an attorney in good 
standing, licensed by the Utah State Bar and holding Utah State Bar 
card #2222. I am experienced in the litigation of the character 
presented by this action. 
2. I am attorney of record for the party as indicated above. 
1963 n: \ -) 
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3. In my capacity as attorney of record for such party I have 
reviewed the file and record of this matter, have consulted with my 
client and others, have advised my client by telephone and office 
visits, have prepared and filed pleadings, have discovered the 
facts attendant to the issues, and have appeared in a 
representative capacity for and with my client at each and all 
hearings as may be indicated by the file of this matter. 
Specifically, actions necessitated by the exigencies of this matter 
include the following: 
Ex Parte Motions for Temporary Restraining Order, 
Preliminary Injunction, and Order to Show Cause, 
Affidavits and Temporary Restraining Order and Order to 
Show Cause, meetings and consultation with Sheriff, 
Hearing of Order To Show Cause, Stipulation, Preliminary 
Injunction, Order, consultation with Pleasant Grove 
detective and Pleasant Grove City Attorney regarding 
Defendant's first violation of Temporary Restraining 
Order, pre-trial hearing, Pre-Trial Order, Affidavits in 
support of and second Motion for Order to Show Cause, 
second Order to Show Cause, hearing on second Order to 
Show Cause, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and 
Judgment Upon Order to Show Cause, consultation with 
Pleasant Grove Police and Utah County Attorney regarding 
2 
Defendant's second violation of Preliminary Injunction, 
three sets of Plaintiff's Interrogatories, and 
Certificates of Service, three sets of responses to 
Defendant's Interrogatories, review of records of Utah 
County Recorder, four Lis Pendens, telephone consultation 
with pay clerk at Hill Air Force Base, consultation with 
real estate appraiser, telephone consultation with banks 
and credit union regarding accounts, multiple meetings 
and consultations with investigator, research of case 
law, Subpoenas for records and appearances (8), telephone 
consultation with Alpine School District, research of 
federal right to privacy law [USCA, Section 552(a)] and 
Motion to Compel for response to Subpoena, consultation 
with parties' tax preparer, review of Defendant's tax 
returns, trial preparation, trial, Release of Lis 
Pendens, drafts of final Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, Decree of Divorce. Qualified Domestic Relations 
Order, Affidavit in Support of Attorney's Fees, 
4. I have contracted with my client to provide such services, 
consultations, and representations at the rate of $60.00 per hour. 
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5. I have dedicated 11.52 hours to date in representation of 
my client in this matter• 
6. As per said fee agreement, and through 19 March, 1989, my 
client has incurred the following expenses in this action: 
attorney fees $4651•00 
advances-service costs 27.00 
filing fees 87o00 
recorders fees 40„00 
witness fees 14,00 
accounting costs 32c00 
investigations 500.00 
appraisals 450.00 
total $5801.00 
7. To date my client has expended $1782.00 toward the above-
noted expenses of this action. 
8. The present unpaid balance of the expenses of this action 
is $4019.00 all of which balance constitutes unpaid attorney's 
fees. 
9. I believe such rate and such total fees at this stage of 
the proceedings to be reasonable, given the amount in controversy, 
the time necessarily expended by me in the matter, the relative 
complexity of the matter, and the comparable rates charged and time 
that would likely be dedicated to such representation by other 
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competent attorneys licensed to practice in this Court, and I 
further believe the various actions taken in Plaintiff's behalf in 
the prosecution of her claims have been reasonable, necessary, 
supported by good cause, and not frivolous nor brought in bad faith 
nor for delay nor harassment. 
10. After-accruing fees will be as set forth in a Supplemental 
Affidavit of Attorney's Fees, if appropriate. 
11. Your affiant proffers that Plaintiff is totally self-
supported from income earned from her present employment at Geneva 
Steel, that in addition to supporting herself she is responsible 
for the total support of her daughter Shirley Schantell Hunter 
(Walters) whom she has custody of, and is partially supporting 
another adult daughter, Angela Cassingham, who lives with 
Plaintiff, who maintains part-time employment with a janitorial 
service, and who is afflicted with a disease which presently 
prevents her from maintaining full time employment and from living 
alone, to wit Guillain-Barre Syndrome. 
12. At the trial of this matter Plaintiff gave testimony of 
her total gross income for 1988. It is your affiant's recollection 
that said total was $26,182.40. 
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13. The legal basis for an award of attorneyfs fees is Section 
30-3-3, Utah Code and the established law regarding awards of 
attorney's fees in actions for divorce as set forth in decisions 
such as Kerr v Kerr, 610 P2nd 1380, Beals v Beals, 682 P2nd 862, 
Cabrera v Cottrel, 694 P2nd 622, Talley v Talley, 739 P2nd 83, 
Newmeyer v Newmeyer, 745 P2nd 1276, Porco v Porco, 752 P2nd 365, 
Rasband v Rasband, 752 P2nd 1313, Aspar v Aspar 753 P2nd 978, 
Andersen v Andersen, 757 P2nd 476, Sorensen v Sorensen, 102 UAR 14, 
and Maughan v Maughan, 102 UAR 44. I believe Plaintiff justly 
deserves an award of attorney's fees and that such award to 
Plaintiff is supported by the facts and circumstances of this 
matter and the statute and decisions above cited. 
Dated this '*2{0 day of J/ff^h^ 1989. 
iditias H. Thom Means 
Affiant 
Attorney for P l a in t i f f 
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
On the ?^/Q day of MftfZCl-l 1989, personally appeared 
before me, Thomas H. Means, who duly acknowledged executing the 
foregoing Affidavit, 
Resi< 
Notary Public 
(seal) 
My commission expires: 
Kv — o , UT y v 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
********************* 
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, 
Defendant. 
CASE NUMBER CV 87-2408 
RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
********************* 
The Court, having reserved the issue of attorney's fees 
in this matter will rule, and will award the plaintiff $1,000.00 
based on need and the relative ability of the parties to pay. 
Counsel for plaintiff to prepare an order incorporating 
the terms of this decision and submit it to opposing counsel for 
approval as to form prior to filing with the Court for signature. 
Dated this 31st day of July, 1989. 
BY 
cc: Thomas H. Means, Esq. 
Robert L. Moody, Esq. 
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THOMAS H. MEANS, #2222 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3 63 North University Avenue 
Suite 103 
P.O. Box 2283 
Provo, Utah, 84603 
[801] 377-7980 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
v ; 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, ] 
Defendant. ] 
| FINDINGS OF FACT and 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
| NO. CV 87 2408 
This matter came on regularly for trial on the 7th day of 
February, 1989. Plaintiff appeared personally and was represented 
by her attorney of record, Thomas H. Means. Defendant also appeared 
personally and was represented by his attorney of record, Robert L. 
Moody. Both parties gave testimony, as did Plaintiff's daughter, 
Sabrina Gunderson. The parties each introduced several exhibits and 
stated their stipulations into the record. Being thereby and 
otherwise fully apprised of the stipulations, facts, law, and 
filings regarding this matter, this Court, having taken the matter 
1 
under advisement and having issued its MEMORANDUM DECISION, now 
hereby enters the following.. . . . 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff was a resident of Utah County at the time of the 
filing of her Complaint and for at least three months prior 
thereto. Defendant was a resident of Utah County at the time of the 
filing of his Counterclaim and for at least three months prior 
thereto. 
2. The parties1 marriage was solemnized on 5 October, 1984, in 
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada. 
3. No children have been born of this marriage and Plaintiff 
is not pregnant. Plaintiff has a minor daughter, Shirley Schantell 
Hunter (Walters) from a prior marriage, born 15 May, 1976, who 
resided with the parties during the entire period when the parties 
resided together. Plaintiff has another daughter, Sabrina 
Gunderson, now married, who resided with the parties for a short 
period when Plaintiff's mobile home was situated at 155 South 1200 
West, Orem, Utah. 
4. During the marriage, differences have developed between the 
parties, which differences the parties have unsuccessfully 
attempted to resolve. Such differences persist. 
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5. The parties have lived separate and apart from and since on 
or about 10 November, 1987. 
6. Plaintiff and her daughter, Shirley Schantell Hunter 
(Walters) have both resided in their present residence situated at 
625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, continuously since in or 
about May, 1980. Plaintiff's daughter has attended the elementary 
and secondary schools servicing that address for her entire 
education and has been and is a member of the local ward of the 
church also servicing that address. Prior to May, 1980, Plaintiff 
and her minor daughter resided in the same mobile home which was 
then located at 155 South 12 00 West, Orem, Utah. This mobile home 
has been the minor's only home. 
7. Defendant has been employed as a civilian employee of the 
federal government from and since 1967 through the time of trial. 
8. During the parties1 marriage Plaintiff has been an employee 
of United States Steel Corporation except for a period when her 
employer ceased operations at the Geneva plant which was the 
location where she was employed. At the time of trial, Plaintiff 
had been re-employed by Geneva Steel for a period of approximately 
one year. 
9. Neither party appears to be presently in need of or 
entitled to the continuing financial support of the other, either 
in the form alimony or child support. 
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10. The parties established a marriage-like relationship 
several years before their marriage was actually solemnized. 
While it is not possible to determine from the evidence the precise 
date when the parties began to cohabit, Plaintiff has established 
by a preponderance of the evidence, and it is reasonable from the 
evidence to find that such relationship commenced on or about 1 
January, 1980, and continued from and since that time through the 
time the marriage was solemnized and until the parties separated. 
From and since 1 January, 1980, the parties cohabited and 
commingled their efforts and their earnings in a manner such as 
would be expected of a married couple. The evidence which supports 
such finding is as follows: 
a. The parties met on the Defendant's birthday, 4 
December, 1978. 
bo At the time they met Plaintiff resided in her mobile 
home which was situated on a rental space at 155 South 12 00 West, 
Orem, Utah. Although Defendant's employment sometimes required 
temporary duty (TDY) assignments out of state at guided missile 
sights, beginning shortly after the parties first met, when not on 
TDY assignments, Defendant stayed with Plaintiff in her mobile 
home. 
c. In May of 1980, Defendant purchased, in his own name, 
a trailer pad at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. At that 
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same time the parties moved Plaintiff's mobile home onto that pad 
where they continued to co-habit. Defendant paid for the costs of 
moving the mobile home to the Pleasant Grove location as well as 
the costs incurred for culinary water and sewer connections. 
d. Defendant did not charge Plaintiff rent for the 
placement of her mobile home on the pad or for her use of the 
realty as her residence. 
e. At various times when Defendant was on TDY 
assignments, Plaintiff helped arranged for and make physical 
improvements to the Defendant's realty on which her mobile home was 
placed and to another parcel that Defendant was purchasing and 
situated at 6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. Such improvements 
included the laying of concrete pads at each location, leveling, 
laying water lines, planting of a lawn, and construction of out-
buildings and a metal building. 
f. While employed, Plaintiff contributed her earnings 
toward the purchase of food, utilities, and other regular living 
expenses. Defendant's earnings were used to make payments on the 
realty. 
g. When Plaintiff was not employed, and while Defendant 
was on TDY assignments, Defendant sent monies home to maintain 
Plaintiff and her daughter. 
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ho Defendant made contributions toward Plaintiff's 
separate debts owed to the I.R.S., the Utah State Tax Commission, 
an encumbrance on her mobile home, and debts owed for the purchase 
of her car, a T.V., and medical expenses incurred in an automobile 
accident. 
i. Although not adopted by Defendant, Plaintiff's minor 
daughter from a prior marriage, with Defendant's knowledge and 
permission, and prior to solemnization of the marriage, attended 
school under Defendant's family name of Walters. 
j. Defendant listed his address on his federal and state 
income tax returns as 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah - the 
same as Plaintiff's residence - for each of the years 1979, 1980, 
1981, 1982, and 1983. 
k. Defendant listed Plaintiff's daughter "Schanny" in his 
federal income tax returns under the category of "dependent 
children who lived with you" for each of the years 1982, 1983, and 
1984. 
1. The evidence does not indicate that the parties' 
relationship changed after the solemnization of their marriage. 
11. At the time of trial Defendant maintained an account at 
Deseret Bank with a balance in an amount of $800.00 and an account 
at America First Thrift with a balance in the amount of $5500.00. 
This Court is without evidence sufficient to establish whether 
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these balances were accumulated prior to or after the parties 
established their marital relationship. However, the balance of the 
America First Thrift account appears to have been accumulated after 
10 November, 1987, the date on or about which Defendant was served 
with a Temporary Restraining Order which is the same date when 
Defendant withdrew $3000.00 from the account. 
12. As of the date of trial Defendant was the record owner of 
four parcels of realty, to wit: 
a. Parcel 1-
625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, on which is 
located Plaintiff's aforementioned mobile home, a 1974 72 foot 
Concord. 
b. Parcel 2-
640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, on which is 
located a 1975 70 foot Brighton mobile home. 
c. Parcel 3-
6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. 
d. Parcel 4-
746 West 600 North, Orem, Utah 
13. Parcel 1 was deeded to Defendant on 27 May, 1980. Parcel 2 
was deeded to Defendant on 18 July, 1985. Parcel 3 was deeded to 
Defendant on 4 August, 1978. Defendant entered into a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract for the purchase of parcel 3 in July, 1977, 
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reciting a down-payment of $2,200.00 with annual payments toward 
the balance of $5,800.00 in amounts of $1,000.00 each scheduled to 
commence in June, 1978. Defendant made a final payment for parcel 3 
in the amount of $1,682.15 on 23 May, 1981. The parties have 
stipulated that Defendant has no equitable interest in the Orem 
parcel and that he is listed as legal owner of parcel 4 only as an 
accommodation to his son to enable his son to acquire equitable 
interests in the property. Parcels 1 and 3 are not encumbered by 
any debt. Parcel 2 is encumbered by a purchase money debt with a 
balance as of the date of trial in the amount of approximately 
$5,000.00. 
14. Defendant testified as to the purchase prices and costs of 
improvements dedicated to parcels 1, 2, and 3 respectively and to 
his opinion of their respective total values as of the date of 
trial. The parties have stipulated to this Court's acceptance into 
evidence of written appraisals of the parcels offered by Plaintiff 
and conducted by Thomas C. Lamoreaux, a Certified Review Appraiser. 
This Court considers Mr. Lamoreauxfs assessment of the valuations 
of the parcels more credible than Defendant's own assessment for 
the following reasons: 
a. Defendant's assessments are based almost exclusively 
on a compilation of purchase price and costs of improvements to 
each parcel. 
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Mr. Lamoreaux's assessments are based on several 
factors including location, access to main arterial roads and 
shopping, existence or non-existence of public improvements, 
adverse easements, and adequate drainage, room size and layout, 
insulation, adequacy of storage and closets, appeal and 
marketability, remaining economic life, availability for expansion, 
comparisons to recent sales of similar and proximate properties, 
income potential, highest and best use, and replacement cost. 
b. Defendant testified to having no significant training 
or experience as an appraiser or builder of similar properties. 
Mr. Lamoreaux's Qualifications Summary attached to his 
appraisal indicates that he has attended courses in real estate 
appraisal given by the American Institute of Appraisers, that he 
has appraised similar properties in the subject area from 1974 to 
the present, that he has experience as a supervisor and general 
contractor of residential construction "from 1971 to 1974, that he 
is a designated appraiser for the Federal National Mortgage 
Association, a Certified Review Appraiser, and a licensed Realtor, 
and that he is a member of the National Association of Review 
Appraisers and the International Right of Way Association. 
Upon the foregoing, this Court accepts and adopts the 
valuations placed on the properties by Mr. Lamoreaux, to wit: 
Parcel 1, with improvements & mobile home: $20,000.00 
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Parcel 2, with improvements & mobile home: $20,000*00 
Parcel 3, with improvements: $10,000,00 
15. The Court finds that because of the marriage-like 
relationship that began on 1 January, 1980, Plaintiff is entitled 
to a share of Defendant's retirement benefits accrued during the 
existence of the marriage-like relationship. The formula which is 
to be used to apportion the Plaintiff's share of the retirement 
benefit is found in Marchant v Marchant, 743 P2nd 199, (Utah App 
1987). The Plaintiff shall not receive any retirement benefits 
until the Defendant retires. If for any reason the Defendant does 
not qualify for the benefit neither will the Plaintiff. In order to 
become eligible to receive retirement benefits when they become 
available, the Court finds that the Plaintiff's counsel must 
prepare an order which is to be filed with the Defendant's employer 
which will give the instructions for payment of retirement benefits 
to the Plaintiff. The formula which should be used in the Order is 
"one-half of his total monthly payment times the fraction in which 
the numerator consists of the number of years or months they 
maintained the marriage-like relationship during which the 
Defendant was employed by the federal government and the 
denominator is the total number of years or months the Defendant 
was in such employment." 
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16. With the exception of the aforementioned encumbrance 
affecting the property at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, and 
the parties1 separate debts incurred since the date of their 
separation on 10 November, 1987, there exist no marital debts for 
which either party is liable either jointly or individually. 
17. The parties have stipulated that Plaintiff should be 
awarded as her sole and separate property the parties1 1980 
Chrysler automobile. 
18. The parties have stipulated that Defendant should be 
awarded as his sole and separate property the parties1 1979 
Chevrolet pick-up truck. 
19. The parties have submitted their respective written lists 
of the other personalty of their marriage and have testified as to 
their respective claims to and needs for such personalty. The 
parties have each claimed entitlement to and need for many of the 
same items of personalty. From the evidence this Court is not able 
to ascertain or assign values to the various items of personalty 
listed or claimed by the parties nor does this Court have evidence 
from which it is able to determine, by a preponderance of the 
evidence which, if any, of such personalty is separate property as 
opposed to property accumulated during the parties1 marital 
relationship. 
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20c Plaintiff has incurred an obligation in excess of $4000*00 
for attorney's fees reasonable to the prosecution of her Complaint, 
The hours expended as well as the hourly rate charged were 
reasonable in light of the complexity of the matter, the results 
obtained, and the hourly rate commonly charged for similar actions 
in this area. Plaintiff is in need of an award from Defendant to 
compensate her for a portion of said attorney's fees. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce dissolving her 
marriage to Defendant. 
2. Defendant is entitled to a Decree of Divorce dissolving his 
marriage to Plaintiff. 
3. Neither party is entitled to an award of alimony or other 
order of lump sum or periodic financial support from the other. 
4. This Court need make no orders regarding liability for 
family or marital debts except that debt affecting the realty 
situated at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, and except 
those separate debts incurred by the parties respectively after the 
date of their separation, as are addressed hereinbelow. 
5. Each party should be held solely and individually liable 
for any and all debt incurred in his or her individual name after 
the date of their separation on 10 November, 1987. 
6. Plaintiff should be awarded as her equitable share of the 
parties1 savings accounts the sum of $3150.00 representing $400.00 
from Defendant's Deseret Bank Account and $2750.00 from Defendant's 
America First Thrift account. Defendant should be awarded the 
remainder of each account. 
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7c Plaintiff should be awarded as her equitable share of the 
parties1 equity in the realty acquired by their joint efforts 
during their marital relationship, all right title and interest in 
and to the realty and improvements - including the mobile home -
situated at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant 
should be ordered to deed and deliver such realty to Plaintiff. 
Defendant should retain all right, title, and interests in and to 
the parties1 realty and improvements - including the mobile home -
situated at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, and the realty 
and improvements situated at 6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. 
Such division is equitable owing to the time periods during which 
such equities were acquired in relation to the marital relationship 
that existed between the parties both prior to and after 
solemnization of their marriage, owing to the respective 
contributions made to acquisition and improvement of the properties 
by each party, owing to the fact that such division preserves the 
long established residence of Plaintiff and her minor daughter as 
well as the minor's school and religious associations, and owing to 
the fact that such division approximates a near equal division of 
the monitory values of the properties. 
8. Defendant should be held solely and individually liable for 
all debt encumbering, associated with, or owing for the realty, 
improvements, and mobile home situated at 64 0 South 50 West, 
14 
Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant should hold Plaintiff harmless 
therefrom. 
9. Plaintiff should be awarded as her sole and separate 
property the parties' 1980 Chrysler automobile. 
10. Defendant should be awarded as his sole and separate 
property the parties' 1979 Chevrolet pick-up truck. 
11. It is proper that the parties' personalty as noted in 
their respective lists of personalty heretofore submitted to and 
accepted as evidence by this Court, excluding the aforementioned 
automobiles and mobile homes, be marshalled, sold, and the proceeds 
therefrom divided equally between them. 
12. Plaintiff is entitled to a proportionate share of 
Defendant's civil service retirement benefits earned through his 
employment during the marital relationship. Such share should be 
determined according to the formula set forth in Marchant v 
Marchant, 743 P2nd 199 (Utah App. 1987). Accordingly, Plaintiff 
should not receive her share of such benefits until Defendant 
retires. If for any reason, Defendant does not qualify for such 
benefits, neither will Plaintiff. Plaintiff!s proportionate share 
should be one half (50%) of the total amount of all of Defendant's 
monthly benefit payments multiplied by the fraction in which the 
numerator is the number of months comprising the period beginning 
on 1 January, 1980, and ending on the date of trial of this matter, 
15 
(109 months) and the denominator is the total number of months 
Defendant is employed by the federal government. The fraction 
cannot be determined until such time as Defendant shall retire. If 
Defendant separates from civil service in advance of retirement, 
and withdraws his contributions, Plaintiff should receive a portion 
of Defendant's refund based upon the above-noted fraction. 
Plaintiff is entitled to an award of such portion of Defendant's 
civil service retirement benefits as well as a Qualified Domestic 
Relations Order setting forth her rights in Defendant's civil 
service retirement benefits and authorizing and instructing the 
United States Office of Personnel Management to pay to her all sums 
to which she is entitled pursuant to the formula set forth 
hereinabove. 
13. It is reasonable that Plaintiff be awarded as and for her 
reasonable attorney's fees the sum of $1000.00. 
Dated this y day of -Aage&t, 1989. 
Approved as to form: 
16 
Robert L. Moody 
Attorney for Defendant 
17 
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THOMAS H* MEANS, #2222 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3 63 North University 
Suite 103 
P.O. Box 2283 
Provo, Utah, 84 603 
[801] 377-7980 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
V ] 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, ] 
Defendant. 
AMENDED | DECREE OF DIVORCE 
I NO. CV 87 2408 
This matter, having come on regularly for trial on the 7th day 
of February, 1989, and this Court, having taken the matter under 
advisement and having issued its MEMORANDUM DECISION, and having 
entered its written FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce dissolving 
her marriage to Defendant, 
2. Defendant is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce dissolving 
his marriage to Plaintiff. 
3. Each party is hereby held solely and individually liable 
for any and all debt incurred in his or her individual name after 
1 
the date of their separation on 10 November, 1987. Each party shall 
hold the other harmless for any and all such debts incurred in 
his/her individual name after 10 November, 1987. 
4. Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her equitable share of the 
parties1 savings accounts the sum of $3150.00 representing a 
$400.00 share of Defendant's Deseret Bank Account and a $2750.00 
share of Defendant's America First Thrift account. Defendant is 
hereby awarded the remainder of each account. 
5. Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her equitable share of the 
parties1 equity in the realty acquired by their joint efforts 
during their marital relationship, all right title and interest in 
and to the realty and improvements - including the mobile home -
situated at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. More 
particularly described as: 
Lot 9, Plat D, Pleasant Grove Mobile Home Estates 
Defendant is hereby ordered to deed and deliver such realty to 
Plaintiff. 
6. It is hereby ordered that Defendant retain all right, 
titls, and interests in and to the parties1 realty and improvements 
- including the mobile home - situated at 64 0 South 50 West, 
Pleasant Grove, Utah, and the realty and improvements situated at 
6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. 
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7. Defendant shall be and is hereby held solely and 
individually liable for all debt encumbering, associated with, or 
owing for the realty, improvements, and mobile home situated at 64 0 
South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant shall hold Plaintiff 
harmless therefrom, 
8. Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her sole and separate 
property the parties1 1980 Chrysler automobile. 
9. Defendant is hereby awarded as his sole and separate 
property, the parties1 1979 Chevrolet pick-up truck. 
10. It is hereby ordered that the parties1 personalty as noted 
in their respective lists of personalty heretofore submitted to and 
accepted as evidence by this Court - but excepting the 
aforementioned automobiles and mobile homes - be marshalled, sold, 
and the proceeds therefrom divided equally between the parties. 
11. Plaintiff is hereby awarded a proportionate share of 
Defendant's civil service retirement benefits earned through his 
employment with the federal government during the marital 
relationship, which is and shall consist of one half (50%) of the 
total amount of all of Defendant's monthly benefit payments 
multiplied by the fraction in which the numerator is 109 and the 
denominator is the total number of months Defendant is employed by 
the federal government. The fraction shall be determined at such 
time as Defendant shall retire. Plaintiff shall not receive her 
3 
share of such benefits until Defendant retires. If Defendant 
separates from civil service in advance of retirement and withdraws 
his contributions, Plaintiff shall receive a portion of such refund 
based on the above-noted fraction. If for any reason, Defendant 
does not qualify for such benefits, neither will Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff is hereby granted and awarded such proportionate share of 
Defendant's civil service retirement benefits as well as a 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order setting forth her rights in 
Defendant's retirement benefits and authorizing and instructing the 
United States Office of Personnel Management to pay to her all sums 
to which she is entitled pursuant to the formula set forth 
hereinabove and hereby granted and awarded to her. 
12. Plaintiff is hereby granted and Defendant is hereby 
ordered to pay as and for Plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees 
the sum of $1000.00. /J > 
Dated this >J/<-/, day of August, 1989. 
Approved as to form: 
Fourth Judicial District 
Utah County 
Robert L. Moody, #2302 
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2525 North Canyon Road 
P.O. Box 1466 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone 801-373-2721 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, 
Defendant. 
SCHEDULE SHOWING RESIDENCY OF 
PARTIES PRIOR TO MARRIAGE 
Case No. CV 87 2408 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
MARK 
Meets Helen 
Montana 
Highland, Utah 
Missouri 
Highland, Utah 
Rapid City, S.D. 
Cheyenne, Wyoming 
Grand Fork, N.D. 
Grand Fork, N.D. 
December, 1978 
January-August, 1979 
August-October, 1979 
October, 1979-May, 1980 
June-July, 1980 
August, 1980-March, 1982 
March, 1982-February, 1984 
February, 1984-July, 1984 
July, 1984 
If-
HELEN 
Meets 
Orem, 
Orem, 
Orem, 
P.G., 
P.G., 
P.G. , 
P.G., 
Grand 
Mark 
Utah 
Utah 
Utah 
Utah 
Utah 
Utah 
Utah 
Fork, ND 
DATED this k~ day of February, 1989. 
h\M IK 
ROBERT L. MOODYI 
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1 DEFENDANT'S 
* EXHIBIT 
NO. 16 
Robert L. Moody, #2302 
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2525 North Canyon Road 
P.O. Box 1466 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone 801-373-2721 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, 
Defendant. 
SCHEDULE OF REAL PROPERTY 
Case No. CV 87 2408 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
COMES NOW the Defendant and hereby submits the 
following schedule of property: 
(1) 6072 West 9600 North 
Acquisition Date: July 1977 
Purchase Price: $ 8,000.00 
Cost of Improvements: $10,000.00 
Present Value: $20,000.00 
Encumbrances: $ 0.00 
Plaintiff's appraisal $|0,000.00 
(2) 625 South 50 West 
Acquisition Date: May 5, 1980 
Purchase Price: $11,500.00 
plus water and sewer hook-up $2,150.00 
Cost of Improvements: $13,000.00 
(not including Plaintiff's mobile home) 
- 1 -
* I 
Present Value: $26,000.00 
Encumbrances: $ 0.00 
Plaintiff's appraisal $20,000.00 
(including Plaintiff's mobile home) 
(3) 640 South 50 West 
Acquisition Date: July 19, 1985 
Purchase Price: $10,500.00 
plus water and sewer hook-up $2,165.00 
Cost of Improvements: $ 0.00 
Present Value: $13,000.00 
Encumbrances: $ 5,000.00 
Plaintiff's appraisal $20,000.00 
(including Defendant's mobile home) 
JL 
DATED this (p - day of February, 1989. 
RT L. MOODY (J ROBE
TAYLOR, MOODY & TH0RNE 
Attorney's for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the fo^" day of February, 
1989, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the 
Plaintiffs's attorney, Thomas H. Means, P.O. Box 2283, Provo, 
Utah 84603; postage prepaid. 
- 2 -
Robert L. Moody, No. 2302 
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2525 North Canyon Road 
P. 0. Box 1466 
Provo, Utah 84603 
(801) 373-2721 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS, 
VS. 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
I.R.S. 
State Tax Commission 
Payment on Trailer 
Payment on Car Loan 
Payment on T.V. Loan 
Wyoming Accident Bills 
Costs to move Trailer 
from Orem to Pleasant Grove 
TOTAL: 
(A 
EXPENSES PAID BY DEFENDANT 
TO ENABLE PLAINTIFF TO 
PRESERVE ASSETS 
Civil No. CV 87 2408 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
$ 4 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
$ 2 , 7 0 0 . 0 0 
$ 3 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
$ 4 0 0 . 0 0 
$ 1 5 0 . 0 0 
$ 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
$ 5 2 1 . 0 0 
$ 1 0 , 3 7 1 . 0 0 
DATED t h i s (g- day of F e b r u a r y , 1 9 8 9 . 
\ 
1 DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT 
13 
30-1-4.5 HUSBAND AND WIFE 
30-1-4.5. Validity of marriage not solemnized. 
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this chapter shall be 
legal and valid if a court or administrative order establishes that it arises out 
of a contract between two consenting parties who: 
(a) are capable of giving consent; 
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage under the 
provisions of this chapter; 
(c) have cohabited; 
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations; and 
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and gen-
eral reputation as husband and wife. 
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage under this section 
must occur during the relationship described in Subsection (1), or within one 
year following the termination of that relationship. Evidence of a marriage 
recognizable under this section may be manifested in any form, and may be 
proved under the same general rules of evidence as facts in other cases. 
History; C. 1953, 30-1-4.5, enacted by L. ter 246, or the application of any provision to 
1987, chc 246, § 2. any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the 
Severability Clauses. — Laws 1987, ch. remainder of the chapter is to be given effect 
246, § 5 provided that if any provision of Chap- without the invalid provision or application. 
30-1-5. Marriage solemnization — Before unauthorized 
person — Validity. 
No marriage solemnized before any person professing to have authority 
therefor shall be invalid for want of such authority, if consummated in the 
belief of the parties or either of them that he had such authority and that they 
have been lawfully married. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, 5 1187; Cross-References. — Authorized person re-
C.L. 1917, § 2970; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, quired to solemnize marriage, * 30-1-2. 
40-1-5. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Foreign common-law marriages. where such marriages are recognized In re 
This section does not render valid a common- Vetas' Estate, 110 Utah 187, 170 P 2d 183 
law marriage entered into in a foreign state (1946). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 52 Am. Jur 2d Marriage lack of legal authority of person solemnizing it. 
^§ 39, 106. 13 A L.R.4th 1323 
C.J.S. — 55 C J S. Marriage o 29 Key Numbers. — Marriage c=» 27 
A.L.R. — Validity of marriage as affected by 
4 0 8 
30-1-1 HUSBAND AND WIFE 
30-1-30. Premarital counseling — State policy — Applicability. 
30-1-31. Premarital counseling board in county — Appointment, terms, compensation, 
offices — Common counseling board with adjacent county. 
30-1-32. Master plan for counseling. 
30-1-33. Conformity to master plan for counseling as prerequisite to marriage license — 
Exceptions. 
30-1-34. Certificate of completion of counseling. 
30-1-35. Persons performing counseling services designated by board — Exemption from 
license requirements. 
30-1-36. Activities included in premarital counseling. 
30-1-37. Confidentialness of information obtained under counseling provisions. 
30-1-38. Fee for counseling. 
30-1-39. Violation of counseling provisions — Misdemeanor. 
30-1-1. Incestuous marriages void. Marriages between parents and 
children, ancestors and descendants of every degree, brothers and sisters 
of the half as well as the whole blood, uncles and nieces, aunts and neph-
ews, first cousins, or between any persons related to each other within and 
not including the fifth degree of consanguinity computed according to the 
rules of the civil law, are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether 
the relationship is legitimate or illegitimate. 
History: R.S. 1898, § 1183; L. 1907, ch. 29, 
§ 1; C.L. 1907, § 1183; C.L. 1917, § 2966; R.S. 
1933 & C. 1943, 40-1-1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Analogous former statutes, 2 Comp. Laws 
1888, ch. V, §§ 2583 to 2601. 
Collateral References. 
Marriage <£=> 10. 
55 CJS Marriage § 16. 
52 AmJur 2d 914-919, Marriage §§ 62-66. 
Cohabitation: liability of one putative 
spouse to other for wrongfully inducing entry 
into or cohabitation under illegal, void, or 
nonexistent marriage, 72 ALR 2d 956. 
Constitutionality of marriage statutes as 
affected by discriminations or exceptions, 3 
ALR 1568. 
Correct name of married woman, 35 ALR 
417. 
Death, right to attack validity of marriage 
after death of party thereto, 47 ALR 2d 1393. 
Duty of husband to provide necessaries for 
wife as affected by her possession of indepen-
dent means, 18 ALR 1131. 
Habit and repute as essential to common-
law marriage, 33 ALR 27. 
Mental capacity to marry, 82 ALR 2d 1040. 
Presumption as to validity of second mar-
riage, 14 ALR 2d 7. 
Subsequent marriage as bar to prosecution 
for rape, 9 ALR 339. 
Validity of common-law marriage, 39 ALR 
538, 60 ALR 541, 94 ALR 1000, 133 ALR 758. 
Validity of marriage as-affected by inten-
tion of the parties that it should be only a 
matter of form or jest, 14 ALR 2d 624. 
30-1-2. Marriages prohibited and void. The following marriages are 
prohibited and declared void: 
(1) With a person afflicted with syphilis or gonorrhea that is communi-
cable or that may become communicable. 
(2) When there is a husband or wife living from whom the person mar-
rying has not been divorced. 
(3) When not solemnized by an authorized person, except as provided 
in Section 30-1-5. 
(4) When the male or female is under sixteen years of age unless con-
sent is obtained as provided in Section 30-1-9. 
(5) When the male or female is under 14 years of age. 
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MARRIAGE 30-1-17.2 
30-1-17.1. Annulment — Grounds for. 
A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes existing at the 
time of marriage: 
(1) When the marriage is prohibited or void under Chapter 1 of Title 
30. 
(2) Upon grounds existing at common law. 
History: C. 1953, 30-1-17.1, enacted by L. 
1971, ch. 65, § 2. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Juir. 2d. — 4 Am. Jur . 2d Annulment of 
Marriage §§ 3-42, 
C.J.S. — 55 C J S Marriage § 50. 
A.L.R. — Concealment of or misrepresenta-
tion as to prior marital status as ground for 
annulment of marriage, 15 A.L.R.3d 759. 
Religion: concealment or misrepresentation 
relating to religion as ground for annulment, 
44 A.L.R.3d 972. 
Identity- what constitutes mistake m the 
identity of one of the parties to warrant annul-
ment of marriage, 50 A.L.R.3d 1295 
Incapacity for sexual intercourse as ground 
for annulment, 52 A.L.R.3d 589 
Finances: spouse's secret intention not to 
abide by written antenuptial agreement relat-
ing to financial matters as ground for annul-
ment, 66 &.L.R.3d 1282. 
Validity of marriage as affected by lack of 
legal authority of person solemnizing it, 13 
A.L.R.4th 1323 
Key Numbers. — Marriage «=> 58. 
30-1-17.2. Action to determine validity of marriage — Or-
ders relating to parties, property and children — 
Legitimacy of children. 
If the parties have accumulated any property or acquired any obligations 
subsequent to the marriage, or there is a genuine need arising from economic 
change of circumstances due to the marriage, or if there are children born, or 
expected, the court mav make temporary and final orders, and subsequently 
modify the orders, relating to the parties, their property and obligations, the 
children and their custody and visitation, and the support and maintenance of 
the parties and children, as may be equitable. The children born to the parties 
after the date of the marriage shall be deemed the legitimate children of both 
of the parties for all purposes. 
History: C. 1953, 30-1-17.2, enacted by L. 
1971, ch. 65, § 3[a]. 
Cross-References. — Nunc pro tunc entrv 
of orders. *j 30-4a-l 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Lord Mansfield rule 
Settlement. 
Lord Mansfield rule. 
The Lord Mansfield Rule, wherebv spouses 
mav not give testimonv which would tend to 
^legitimatize child born to wife during the 
marriage, was adopted Lopes v Lopes, 30 
Utah 2d 393, 518 P 2d 687 d974) 
Settlement. 
Court which granted annulment had author-
ity to grant wife a $1,200 bettlement to enable 
her and her son bv a prior marriage to return 
to her native Thailand Maple v Maple, 566f 
P2d 1229 (Utah 1977) 
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